University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1995

One Judge's View of the Uniform Commercial
Code in Bankruptcy Court: Why It Doesn't Work
the Way You Thought It Would
Nancy C. Dreher

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Dreher, Nancy C., "One Judge's View of the Uniform Commercial Code in Bankruptcy Court: Why It Doesn't Work the Way You
Thought It Would" (1995). Minnesota Law Review. 1996.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1996

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

One Judge's View of the Uniform Commercial
Code in Bankruptcy Court: Why It Doesn't
Work The Way You Thought It Would
The Honorable Nancy C. Dreher*
INTRODUCTION
I want to thank Steve Nickles and Ed Adams for asking me
to speak tonight. I am delighted to be in the company of such
great Uniform Commercial Code scholars.
In order to prepare for this speech, I asked my law clerk to
gather all my Uniform Commercial Code opinions since I became a bankruptcy judge. I also asked her to find some funny
Uniform Commercial Code cases. She found my opinions, but
failed to find any funny cases. Apparently, the Uniform Commercial Code is about as funny as the Tax Code-and that's saying something!
Lo and behold, with my opinions before me, I was reminded
that I do have something to say to this group. It concerns what I
know best, that is, what is really happening to the Uniform
Commercial Code in the courts.
I thought perhaps it might be helpful to you if I chronicled
the experience I have had in interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code in my nearly seven years as a bankruptcy judge. During that time I have written nine opinions, four of them
published, directly addressing Uniform Commercial Code issues. Initially, that does not seem like many. After all, I have
handled 20,000 or so bankruptcy cases since 1988. But, upon
reviewing these cases, I realize there are things to be learned.
Several of my opinions address cutting edge issues that the
Study Committee targeted for review by the Drafting Committee. Because my docket is fairly typical of those in other bankruptcy courts, it may be worth studying them carefully. After
* United States Bankruptcy Judge, District of Minnesota. Judge Dreher
presented this speech at a dinner meeting held in connection with the conference on October 28, 1994. The text of the speech has been modified only to
include citations to authorities.
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having done so, I will state some conclusions and make some
suggestions for the Drafting Committee.
I. ARTICLE 9 OPINIONS
The majority of my written decisions concerning the Uniform Commercial Code deal with Article 9. The following is a
brief description of these cases.
1. Miller v. Norwest Bank Minnesota (In re Investment &
Tax Services,Inc.)1 addressed the scope of Article 9. The trustee
for the debtor corporation recovered the proceeds of a "key man"
life insurance policy. The debtor's bank, a secured creditor, held
a lien on the debtor's assets, which included contract rights and
general intangibles. The bank had not, however, taken an assignment of the policy, nor been named as an insured. Nonetheless, the bank argued that its security interest extended to the
debtor's claim under the insurance policy on the petition date,
entitling the bank to the proceeds. I rejected this argument because section 9-104(g) explicitly excludes an "interest or claim in
or under" an insurance policy. In reaching this conclusion, I rejected an oft-cited and much maligned federal district court
opinion 2 and cited with favor a very good opinion by Bankruptcy
Judge Federman. 3 The Study Committee has recommended revising section 9-104(g) to include business insurance policies.
Apparently, therefore, the Study Committee would agree that
my opinion was correct.
2. Drewes v. United States (In re Bukowski) 4 involved a
guarantor who fully paid a bank's loan on the tractor of the debtors after the case had been commenced. The trustee then commenced an action to avoid the guarantor's lien on the tractor. I
was faced with the issue of whether the guarantor was entitled
to assert the bank's secured priority status. I rejected the argument that equitable principles should override the filing priority
provisions of Article 9. I held that, as a matter of equity, a judicial lien should be superior to a guarantor's right to assert a per1. 148 B.R. 571 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992).
2. Meridian Bank v. Bell Fuel Corp. (In re Bell Fuel Corp.), 99 B.R. 602
(E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 891 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1989).
3. Rouse v. Kroehler Cabinet Co. (Inre Kroehler Cabinet Co.), 129 B.R.
191 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd sub nom., MNC Commercial Corp. v. Rouse,
No. 91-0615-CV-W-2, 1992 WL 674733 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 1992). I also cited
with approval In re Silicon Electro-Physics, Inc., 116 B.R. 442 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1990).
4. 109 B.R. 932 (Bankr. D. Minm. 1990), rev'd sub nom., Drewes v. Bukowski, 938 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
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fected security interest under the doctrine of subrogation if the
guarantor's right did not mature until after the judgment lien
attached. The district court reversed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court.5
On remand, I first applied section 509(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which explicitly provides that the guarantor's rights must
be subrogated to the bank's interest, thereby prohibiting the
avoidance of the guarantor's lien. Throughout the case's tortuous path from bankruptcy court to district court to the Eighth
Circuit and back down again, neither party had referenced section 509(a). My decision on remand refused to apply equitable
principles and simply applied the clear Bankruptcy Code
6
mandate.
The Study Committee addressed the applicability of equitable principles to Article 9 priority issues and recommended no
change to section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The
Study Committee did, however, recommend changes to the Comments to point out and illustrate appropriate and inappropriate
uses of equitable principles.
3. I decided In re Hemingson7 shortly after I became a
judge in 1988. In this case, I held that a purchase money security interest in collateral is not automatically extinguished when
the loan is refinanced. I rejected the "transformation" line of
cases and adopted the "dual status" line of cases. Specifically, I
stated:
This court accepts the "dual status" rule because it gives credence to
the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 9-107 states that a security
interest is a purchase money security interest to the extent that it is
taken by one making a loan that enables a debtor to acquire rights in
the collateral. The courts that follow the transformation rule merely
exalt form over substance. 8

In order to achieve this result, however, I had to distinguish,
with some difficulty, two prior and arguably contrary Minnesota
bankruptcy cases. 9 One year later, in In re Bourman,10 I reiterated that refinancing should not automatically extinguish a
purchase money security status.
5. Drewes, 938 F.2d at 188.
6. See No. 6-88-563, Adv. No. 6-89-35, 1991 WL 135024, at *2 (Bankr. D.
Minn. July 19, 1991).
7. 84 B.R. 604 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
8. Id. at 607.
9. See In re Psick, 61 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Slechta, No.
3-84-1456, 1985 WL 17579 (Bankr. D. Minn. June 26, 1985).
10. No. 6-87-346, 1989 WL 30920 (Bankr. D. Minn. Apr. 3, 1989).
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The Study Committee has recommended that a renewal,
refinancing, or other restructuring of a debt should not destroy
the purchase money character of a security interest. Apparently, once again, the Study Committee would conclude that I
got it right. Hemingson, by the way, was my first decision to be
discussed nationally in the reporting systems. I was frightened
to death that I had gotten it wrong.
4. Mund v. HeritageBank (In re Willmar NursingHome)'"
was a truly unfortunate decision. In this case, I would have
been pleased to be reversed by the Eighth Circuit if the reversal
would have achieved some clarity in the law. The issue in Heritage Bank was whether the assignment of a vendor's interest in
a contract for deed, recorded in the county recorder's office, properly perfected the bank's security interest in the payments
under the contract. No financing statement had been filed
under Article 9. Therefore, I was dealing with the intersection
of real estate conveyancing law and Article 9.
The problem in HeritageBank was that the Eighth Circuit
had previously issued two inconsistent rulings in this area. In
Shuster v. Doane (In re Shuster),i 2 the Eighth Circuit held that
an assignment of a vendor's interest in a contract for deed transfers both the interest in the right to payments and the interest
in realty and that recording in accordance with real estate recordation rules was adequate.' 3 That should have spelled the
death knell for the plaintiff's section 544 avoidance action, except for the fact that Shuster seemed to be directly contrary to
the Official Comments to section 336.9-102(3) of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and also contrary to several other cases not
5
from our circuit' 4 and a Minnesota state court decision.' Moreover, in Mercantile Bank v. Brown (In re Holiday Intervals,
Inc.), 16 the Eighth Circuit had recently held that a vendor's interest in a land sale contract was a "general intangible" that had

to be filed under Article

9.17

11. No. 4-89-2921, Adv. No. 4-91-14, 1991 WL 172017 (Bankr. D. Minn.
Aug. 21, 1991).
12. 784 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1986).
13. Id. at 884-85.
14. See Peoples Bank v. McDonald (In re Maryville Say. & Loan Corp.), 743
F.2d 413, 416-17 (6th Cir. 1984), supplemented, 760 F.2d 119, 121 (6th Cir.
1985); Swanson v. Union State Bank (In re Hoeppner), 49 B.R. 124, 127-29
(Band. E.D. Wis. 1985).
15. See Nichols v. L & 0, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 465, 468 n.7 (Minn. 1972).
16. 931 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1991).
17. Id. at 502-03 (quoting JAMES J. WnrTE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIL CODE § 23-7, at 274 (3d ed. 1988)).
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In HeritageBank, I concluded that Shuster and Holiday Intervals were totally inconsistent, explained why the Shuster case
was wrong, and then followed Shuster because the facts in the
two cases were indistinguishable and because it was binding
precedent. I encouraged the losing party to appeal and it did.
The district court followed my reasoning in an opinion that
closely paralleled mine and affirmed. Contrary to the hopes of
both lower courts, the Eighth Circuit did not reverse us. Instead, it issued a one paragraph per curiam opinion affirming
and citing Shuster in support."'
5. Bergquist v. Kinney (In re Hanson)1 9 involved a fairly
straightforward issue. This was a dispute between the trustee
and the purchaser of a business from the debtors. The sale was
pursuant to contract for deed that provided that $28,000 in
equipment was to be secured. Unfortunately for the purchaser,
he filed the financing statement in the Country Recorder's Office
rather than the Secretary of State's office. I held that the security interest covering personal property had been filed in the
wrong place and voided it in favor of the trustee. The most significant point about this case from your perspective is the creditor's argument that a filing in the Recorder's Office ought to be
deemed a filing in the Secretary of State's office because the two
were connected by computer. I rejected this argument, stating:
Pursuant to section 336.9-411, the Secretary of State has authority to
implement a computerized filing system to "accumulate and disseminate information" relative to financing statements. While the statute
is silent concerning its effect on UCC sections 336.9-401, the purpose of
the system appears to be to check liens, not to perfect them. Section
336.9-401 is very precise as to the correct place of filing for every type
of security interest. To adopt Kinney's argument that the distinction is
obsolete in light of the computerized network would render section
336.9-401 meaningless. Absent clear language indicating such
0 an effect, I cannot ignore the plain language of section 336.9-401.2

6. My last Article 9 opinion, Christians v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren,Ltd. (In re Bastyr),2 1 involved a situation
where the secured party filed under an incorrect name. I had to
decide whether the filing substantially complied with section 9402(8) of the Uniform Commercial Code. I concluded that, despite the minor errors, a hypothetical creditor exercising reason18. 996 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
19. No. 4-93-439, Adv. No. 4-93-102, 1993 WL 335425 (Bankr. D. Minn.
Aug. 26, 1993), aff'd, Civ. No. 4-93-933 (D. Minn. Mar. 21, 1994).
20. Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
21. No. 4-88-1868, Adv. Nos. 4-90-15, 4-90-16, 4-90-17 (Bankr. D. Minn.

July 13, 1990).
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able diligence would have discovered the financing statement,
and the trustee, therefore, could not avoid the lien.
II. ARTICLE 2 OPINIONS
My only two opinions on Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code were decided years ago. Perhaps I got them so wrong
practitioners are afraid to give me another crack at messing up
the law.
1. In Chemical-Ways Corp. v. Page (In re Dynamic Technologies Corp.),2 2 I refused to allow certain vendors to reclaim
goods that they had shipped to the debtor. The first paragraph
of my opinion began: "The issue in these adversary proceedings
is whether the twenty-four plaintiffs, all of whom are unsecured
creditors, should be allowed to improve their position over
debtor's nearly 250 other unsecured creditors similarly situated."23 After that, it was hardly necessary to read the rest of
the twenty page opinion to figure out who was going to win.
None of the reclaiming creditors had made a written demand for
24
return of their goods within ten days of the date of delivery.
The reclaiming vendors sought to avoid the strictures of section
546 of the Bankruptcy Code by asserting rights under common
law, alleging theft by trick, reclamation rights under section 2702 of the Uniform Commercial Code (which does not include a
ten-day limitation where the buyer has made a misrepresentation of solvency to the seller in writing within three months
before delivery), rescission, and constructive trust. I held that
section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code was the vendors' exclusive
remedy and that, having failed to comply with that section, they
could not reclaim. Dynamic Technologies is illustrative of instances when common law clashes with the clear language of the
Bankruptcy Code. It was a particularly compelling case for the
vendors because it looked as though debtor had engaged in a
bankruptcy scam. Nonetheless, the vendors lost, based on what
I thought was a clear reading of the Bankruptcy Code.
2. The last case I need to mention is Bergquist v. Kisch Oil
Co. (In re Clermont),25 which addressed whether goods that the
shipper reclaimed days before the bankruptcy filing had been
22. 106 B.R. 994 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989).
23. Id. at 997.
24. Id. at 1000. Section 2-702(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides
that a seller may reclaim goods upon demand within 10 days after the receipt.
25. No. 4-88-3462, Adv. No. 4-88-376, 1989 WL 68309 (Bankr. D. Minn.
June 19, 1989).
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shipped on consignment. I ruled that the trustee could recover
the goods from the vendor because the vendor had failed to take
the steps necessary to establish a consignment sale under section 2-326 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
CONCLUSION
So, why do I run you through this litany of "My Life as a
Bankruptcy Judge with the Uniform Commercial Code?" Certainly not because I have a big ego and like to read, reread, and
have others read my opinions, although some have accused me
of that. Nor do I do it because I think you will necessarily agree
with my conclusions. Rather, I think it has some lessons for
those interested in uniform commercial law. In the few minutes
I have available, I'll highlight a few.
The number of cases is few. I do not think that means
everything is fine and for the most part does not need to be fixed.
For every written decision that bankruptcy judges write, there
are hundreds and thousands of similar problems that never
reach our desks or that are resolved daily without any opinions.
No, there are many, many things that need to be addressed.
While the Uniform Commercial Code is promulgated under circumstances that lend themselves to careful and reasoned draftsmanship (some might say unlike the Bankruptcy Code), the
cases I list demonstrate the need for constant updating and
examination.
A second point that is illustrated is that bankruptcy courts
are the commercial courts in this country. If you are writing
commercial codes you may expect that most, if not all, decisions
interpreting and applying them will be rendered in bankruptcy
courts. State trial courts do not publish opinions. State intermediate courts of appeal are generally too swamped to write
much of an opinion. In Minnesota, for example, intermediate
appellate court opinions are limited in length and non-binding.
State supreme courts are typically courts with only certiorari jurisdiction. My experience is that they write very few commercial
law decisions. The bankruptcy bench, on the contrary, is populated with extremely able and prolific writers. Many of them
view it to be their job to actively engage in the development of
the law in all areas, including commercial law. We probably
write way too much, but that is how it is. And, we tend to be
ready (without ill intent) to take on other bankruptcy decisions
with which we disagree. This makes for lots of interesting
interchange.
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The Heritage Bank case, 26 which was the one where I
wanted to be reversed, illustrates my third point. Most of the
law in this area will be written at the trial court level. In Heritage Bank, both lower courts tried to obtain clarification at the
circuit court level. Busy caseloads on appeal very often prevent
that.
The Bukowski case, 27 which dealt with subrogation and in
which neither the parties nor any judge at three levels really got
it right the first time, demonstrates a phenomenon that appears
all too frequently. I do not wish to be critical, but I suggest to
you that the amount of help bankruptcy judges get from litigants in many areas is often minimal to nonexistent. Too often
there is not enough at stake, or the litigants lack the resources
to help the judges get to the right answer. It is commonplace, for
example, for briefs and memoranda to be sketchy, and, worse
yet, for issues to be raised for the first time on appeal. This
makes for mistakes and less than perfect opinions.
Hemingson,28 my refinancing case, illustrates my next
point-the Bankruptcy Code, even if carefully written, is often
susceptible to differing readings. The issue in Hemingson revolved around the definition of a purchase money security interest and the lack of clear direction on what should happen in case
of a refinancing. The absence of clear language in the Bankruptcy Code contributed to the wide split in the cases on the
issue.
And, finally, Investment & Tax Services,29 my insurance
case, illustrates how an unclear sentence in a Comment of the
Uniform Commercial Code can cause some court to issue a truly
aberrational and inconsistent decision. As discussed, the Bell
decision rested on a reading of a Comment that I thought
26. Mund v. Heritage Bank (In re Willmar Nursing Home), No. 4-89-2921,
Adv. No. 4-91-14, 1991 WL 172017 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 21, 1991). See supra
notes 11-18 and accompanying text (discussing the issues of the case and related decisions).
27. Drewes v. United States (In re Bukowski), 109 B.R. 932 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1990), rev'd sub noma., Drewes v. Bukowski, 938 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam), reh'g on remandsub nom., Drewes v. United States (In re Bukowski), No. 6-88-563, Adv. No. 6-89-35, 1991 WL 135024 (Bankr. D. Minn. July
19, 1991). See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the case).
28. In re Hemingson, 84 B.R. 604 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988). See supra notes
7-9 and accompanying text (reviewing the reasoning of the case).
29. Miller v. Norwest Bank Minnesota (In re Investment & Tax Servs.,
Inc.), 148 B.R. 571 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992). See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the case).
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strange, but another court thought sensible. One commentator
said the Bell court just "missed the boat."3 0 That left litigants
and judges like myself and Judge Federman to try to straighten
out the law.
The remaining cases illustrate that people are human and
make mistakes. Much of the Uniform Commercial Code law is a
product of people filing in the wrong place, at the wrong time, or
under the wrong name.
What I am trying to say, if not terribly articulately, is that
uniformity comes at two levels. One is in the drafting and adoption of a uniform code, and the other is in its interpretation. Because of where the Uniform Commercial Code is played out,
uniformity in the law may be very difficult to achieve. The law
is developed in bankruptcy courts where chaos is at times the
norm, shooting from the hip may be required for survival, and
people very often do not have the time or the resources necessary for carefully reasoned results. We do our best, and we do it
extremely well, I think, but we often do it under strained circumstances. This clearly places a premium on careful draftsmanship, both in the Uniform Commercial Code and its
Comments.
I hope that this speech has brought a strong dose of practical reality to your drafting process and that I have adequately
demonstrated "Why It Doesn't Always Work The Way You
Thought It Would."

30. See Rouse v. Kroehler Cabinet Co. (In re Kroehler Cabinet Co.), 129
B.R. 191, 195 n.1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991).

